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666 IN RE DENNIS [51 C.2d 
No. 6364. In Bank. 1\Iar. 2, 1959.] 
In re BARNEY A. DENNIS, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Crimin~JJ Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.-The 
by Pen. Code, § relating to determi-
when doubt thereof arises prior 
unu~:lll'-' defendant's present ability 
so to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings 
taken him as to be able to conduct his own defense in a 
rational manner. 
[2] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of San-
ity as Basis for Trid.-A stmng showing is required before 
an abuse of discretion is deemed to result from the trial court's 
failure to order a determination of present sanity; the "doubt" 
as to defendant's sanity, requiring trial of such issue under 
Pen. Code, § 1368, must arise in the mind of the trial judge 
rather than in the mind of defendant's counsel or in that of 
any third person. 
[3] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of San-
ity as Basis for TriaL-Testimony of experts as to insanity in 
a general sense is not sufficient to create a doubt as to defend-
ant's sanity, requiring a trial of such issue under Pen. Code, 
§ 1368, insofar as that testimony does not relate to defendant's 
ability to conduct bis own defense. 
[4] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Discretion of 
Court.-vVhen a doubt of defen(hmt's sanity at the time of 
trial as contemplated by Pen. Code, § 1368, appears on the face 
of the record as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion is 
shown by failure to Ol'der a determination of the question of 
sanity, such failure results in a miscarriage of justice, and a 
reversal is required. 
[5] !d.-Rights of Accused-Presence at TriaL-In a felony case, 
the prisoner must be present during: the whole of his trial. 
(Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 1043.) 
[6] Id.-Rights of Accused-Presence at Trial.-The requirement 
that defendant he present at eYery stage of a felony prosecu-
-------------------------------------------------------
[1] Test of present insanity which will preyent trial for crime 
or punishment after conviction, note, 3 A.L.R. !)4. See Cal.Jnr.2d, 
Criminal Law, § 250 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 47 et seq. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crimi-
nal Law, § 189 ct seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 236(1): 3] Crimi-
nal Law, ~ 236(2): Criminal Law, § 236(5); [5-8] Criminal 
Law, ~ 115; [9, 11, J2] Criminal Law, ~ 359(8); [10] Criminal 
Law,§ 359(9); [13] Habeas Corpus,§ 18; [14] Habeas Corpus,§ 68. 
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tion means that he must be both and mpntally 
present; mere physical presence without mental rpa]izaiion of 
what is going on would he of no value. 
[7] !d.-Rights of Accused-Presence at Trial.~'iVlwn defendant's 
presence at his trial will be useful or of benefit to him and his 
counsel, the lack of his presenec becomes a denial of due process 
of law. 
[8] !d.-Rights of Accused-Presence at Trial.-A defendant in a 
criminal case must be present at a trial when evidence is 
offered, since the opportunity must be his to advise with his 
counsel. 
[9] Id.-Presumptions-Sanity.-On trial of the issue raised by a 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that defendant was sane at the time the crime 
was committed, and defendant has the burden of proving his 
insanity by a preponder::mce of evidence. 
[10] Id.- Presumptions- Insanity.- Proof that defendant was 
afflicted with a permanent insanity, as distinguished from a 
temporary or transient in10anity, prior to commission of the 
crime charged will dispel the presumption of sanity and raise 
a presumption that his insanity continued to exist until the 
time of commission of the crime. 
[11] Id.-Presumptions-Sanity.-The presumption of sanity is 
disputable and may be overcome by a preponderanee of evi-
dence to the contrary. 
[12] !d.-Presumptions-Sanity.-'iVhere the evidence is uncon-
tradicted and entirely to the effect that the aecused is insane, 
the precmmption of sanity may not be permitted to prevail. 
(Disapproving any implication to the contrary in People v. 
Chambc1·lain, 7 Cal.2d 2;)7, 60 P.2d 299.) 
[13] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Violation of Constitutional Rights. 
-A conviction of assault with intent to commit murder and 
of assault with a deadly weapon should be set aside on habeas 
corpus where defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced 
while insane, such procedure being in violation of his consti-
tutional rights. 
[14] !d.-Judgment-Discharge and Remand.-When a conviction 
is set aside on habeas corpus for violation of Jefendant's consti-
tutional with respect to trial while insane, he must be 
remanded to the custody of the sheriff for determination by the 
trial court of his present sanity or insanity. If he is found to 
be sane, the issue of sanity at the time of commission of the 
offenses, as raised by his original plea, should be retried. 
[9] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, ~ 70 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evi-
dence, § 215. 
& ,} enscn and \Vill iam ,J enspn for Petitioner. 
A. Dennis was convietcd and sen-
in 195·1 on two counts of assault with 
intent to commit murder and four counts of assault 1rith a 
\\-capon. fol' a of habeas <:orpus has been 
filed on his behalf in this <:ourt.l 
contcution is that Dennis convietcd and 
sentenced \vhile insane and that therefore he is eon-
fined in San Quentin Prison. 
Dennis in au information \\·ith the of 
his wife and five officers who came to the 
he entered the of not 
Section that ''A person 
for a 
court must order 
to be detcrminrd a trial the court without a 
or with 
drfz•ndant has been 
<:r·imiual 
to the diserrtion of until the determination of the 
issue of '' 
'l'he trial of defendant eommeneed before ihe court ·without 
in this an 
will l1e r0ferred to as 
for llnlJeas c01·pns in 
defendant was hy this court iu Sc•ptcmhcr, ] 
'Houorahlc John A. Hewicker was the trial judge. 
6G9 
the 
of 
Pxnmin<>r <·tms!ders that Jlis was 
his mcu tal ill nrss and be ]a eked 
nm1crstmHl the; nainre and of 
so disonleretl of mim1 that he ·was unable to 
''He is abl(• to <·ooperate with his in the 
of his own drfense at this time.'' 
;uv• 19. ] Dr. E!nwr 
, and filed with the court on .Jnne 23, 
i;l pari, that "r feel that this man 
is in,mw; not a hle to cooperate with JJiR 
attorHey; doz•s uot know the differem•e between and 
wrong; and tlwt th condition existed at the time of the 
assault and has existe<1 for a of mauy years. 
I believe that he is in need or ; thnt he is poten-
beeanse of hi:;; assanHive tendencies 
state.'' 
-k a letter 
adcln•flsed to the distric•t Count;-
whi<~h \Yas later introdneed in rvidPm·e at 1he trial. Dr. Snlt 
noted that Denni,; had been fl'Om tlw United States 
in 1!H4 "on the basis of type"; 
had twice been thc~rcfor in the San Diego 
He eonl"lnded that "In my ion Barney 
Allen Drnnis is insa11e in that he does not know right from 
Y\Tong. It likewise my that at the time of the shoot-
"'rho 
obviously 
stamped filing date of '' .Jun 1-1954'' which is 
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in he also was insane and did not know right from 
wrong. He is snffering with Schizophrenia, paranoid type. 
"DisCi/.~sioft: type, is a t~hronic, 
incurable disease. It is my opinion that this man should be 
committed to a State Hospital for the criminally insane for 
the remainder of his life. Hegardless of how well he would 
appear to recover under any form of treatment, he would be a 
threat to " 
In a report dated 2, and filed with the court on 
,July 3, 1954, Dr. C. E. Lengyel, a psychiatrist, who examined 
Dennis at the request of the District Attorney of San Diego 
County, stated that ''I saw this man on a previous oceasion 
on July 23, 1948. At that time I described him as being 
aggressive, arrogant, uncooperative, and belligerent. My diag-
nosis at that time was dementia praecox, paranoid type. I 
considered him to be psychotic then, and I do now. 
''Diagnosis: Schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type. 
"It is my opinion that this man was psychotic at the time 
of commission of the act, namely shooting several people. I 
feel that the type of condition that he is suffering from is a 
chronic type of psychosis; that he presents a hazard to others 
for he is paranoid, aggressive, and unpredictable. He reacts on 
impulse, and it is my opinion that this man will probably 
never recover.'' 
Drs. Crowley, Lengyel and Peterson testified at the trial in 
accordance with their reports, and Dr. Sult 's report was ad-
mitted in evidence. The People presented no evidence to the 
contrary. 
[1] 'l'his court held in People v . . llparicio, 38 Cal.2d 565, 
567 [241 P.2d 221], that "The sanity contemplated by the code 
section is tested by appraising the present ability of the de-
fendant to so understand the nature and purpose of the 
proceedings taken against him as to be able to conduct his own 
defense in a rational manner. (People v. Perry, 14 Cal.2d 
387, 399 [94 P.2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 1123]; In re Buchanan, 129 
Cal. 330, 334 [61 P. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378]; People v. West, 
25 Cal.App. 369 [143 P. 793]; see also 3 A.I1.R 94.) [2] A 
strong showing is required before an abuse of discretion is 
deemed to result from the failure of the trial court to order 
a determination of present sanity. It was said in People v. 
Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, at 789 [161 P.2d 227]: "l'he "doubt" 
mentioned is one that mnst arise in the mind of the trial 
jndge, rather than in the mind of counsel for the defendant 
or in that of any third person (People v. Perry, supra, 14 Cal. 
Mar. 1959] IN RE DENNIS 671 
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2d 387, 399 124 A.T_j.R. , and eases there 
and the determination of a motion for a upon 
the issue of a defendant's at the time of the trial is one 
which rests within the sound discretion of the court. Neces-
sarily, an appellate court cannot measure to a the basis 
for the ruling, and the trial judge must be allowed a wide 
latitude (citing cases) ... ' [3] Even the of ex-
perts as to insanity in a general sense is not sufficient to create 
a doubt insofar as that testimony does not relate to the defend-
ant's ability to conduct his own defense. (People v. Darling, 
107 Cal.App.2d 635 [237 P.2d 691] ; see also People v. Hun-
toon, 41 Cal.App. 392 [182 P. 776] .) [4] However, when a 
doubt of the defendant's sanity at the time of the trial as 
contemplated by the statute appears on the face of the record 
as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown and the 
failure to order a determination of the question of sanity 
results in a miscarriage of justice and a reversal is required. 
(People v. Vester, 135 Cal.App. 223 [26 P.2cl 685]; People v. 
West, supra, 25 Cal.App. 369.)" (People v. 1Ylerkouris, 46 
Cal.2d 540, 553 [297 P.2d 999] .) 
Bearing the above rule in mind, it appears that all of the 
reports which were filed prior to trial were to the effect that 
the defendant was not only insane at the time of the commis-
sion of the offenses but was insane at the time of trial, and two 
of them specifically pointed out that he was unable to cooperate 
with his attorney in conducting his defense. All of the testi-
mony at the trial was to the same effect as heretofore noted. 
The petitioner here alleges upon information and belief that 
after defendant was imprisoned, the court-appointed attorney 
who then represented him filed a notice of appeal; that the 
appeal was thereafter dismissed by the attorney at the request 
of defendant's mother while the defendant was still insane 
and imprisoned at the 'l'erminal Island Medical Facility. 
It is argued by petitioner that defendant was, in legal effect, 
deprived of his constitutional right to be present at his trial 
because his mental condition prevented him from knowing 
what was occurring and that this lack of mental presence 
constituted a denial of due process of la-w. [5] In People v. 
Berling, 115 Cal.App.2d 255, 267, 268 [251 P.2d 1017], the 
court held that ''Article I, section 13, of the California Consti-
tution gives a defendant the right to appear and defend in 
person, and section 1043 of the Penal Code provides that 'If 
the prosecution be for a felony, the defendant must be present 
at the trial.' (Italics added.) The rule is familiar and funda-
above rc-
that a defendant be present of a fel-
is that the accused person 
present. Mere presence 
without mental realization of what \Yas on would ob-
be of no value to the accused. A defpndant in such 
condition "WOuld be unable to confer with or assists ···'".""'"'" 
unable to and without to understand the nature 
of the accusation or the mechanics or consqucnees of the trial. 
An interpretation of the rule 
enee would lead to such an 
an imbecile or an insane person without the least understand-
of what in the c-ourtroom. in the 
most unenlightened age could such a so-called trial be counte-
nanced.'' 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the 
states may not take away from a defendant notice of the 
charge against him and an adequate opportunity to be heard 
in defense of it. ('!'wining v. New J erscy, 211 U.S. 78, 110, 111 
[29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97] ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
68, 71 [ 33 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R 527] ; Holmes v. 
Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 632 [36 S.Ct. 681, 60 L.Ed. 1211] ; 
v. 291 U.S. 97, 105 [54 S.Ct. 330, 78 
L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. .) v. 291 
l'J.S. 97, 106, 107, 108, the Court of the United 
States held: ''So far as the Pourteenth Amendment is con-
cerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due proc-
ess to the extent that a fair and just would be thwarted 
by his absence, and to that extent only.'' 'l'he court discussed 
the matter of the presence of the defendant in various 
of the proceedings against him as an clement of due process. 
The court stated : ''In all the cases thus assumed the presence 
of the defendant satisfies the test that was put forward a 
moment ago as basic and decisive. It bears, or may fairly be 
assumed to bear, a rc>lation, reasonably substantial, to his op-
portunity to defend. Nov,-here in the decisions of this court is 
there a dictum, and still less a ruling, that the Pourteenth 
Amendment assures the privilege of presence when presence 
would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'' [7] In other 
SlaL'ski 
supra.'' 
In 
299], where 10 
long professional 
out 
affirmed a judgment entered upon a 
defendant sane which 1vas 
673 
of sanity. It was held that "'fhe appearance, man-
nerisms and actions of the defendant before the jurors during 
the trial, and the character of his and mann0r of 
giving it, were matters properly to be considered them. 
\Ve cannot say that the the defendant iu these 
partieulars during the 
at the trial in their the 
defendant was sane, did not have suff\cient evidcnee on which 
to base the verdiet in this case.'' vV e held in v. 
Baker, 42 Ca1.2d 5G<± P.2d "On the trial 
of the issue raised the 
there is a rebuttable 
at the time the crime was committed 
518; v. 159 Cal. 6, 11 
1912B 1193] ; 184 
1019]; 
P. 1117]; 
779] ; People v. 
and defendant has the 
preponderance of the evidence 
2d 876, 901 [256 P.2d 911]). [10] Proof that defendant 
was afflicted with a permanent as from 
a temporary or transient insanity, prior to the commission of 
51 C.2d-22 
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the crime 
sanity and raise a presumption 
to exist until the time of tlw commission of the 
v. 31 Cal. 576, 581; 
188-191; 101 Cal. 
People v. 106 Cal. 53 
Fi11dlcy, 132 CaL 301, 307 [64 P. 
Cal. 794, 800-801 [175 P. 6]; State 
Ore. 291, 299-309 [225 P.2d 771] and authorities cited; see 
8 Cal.J ur., § 143; 27 A.hR2d 121 ; 1 \Yharton 's Criminal 
Evidence, § 212 [11th ed. 1935].)" [11] It is apparent 
from the rules set forth in People v. Baker, supra, that the 
presumption of sanity is a disputable one v;hieh may be over-
come by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. 
[12] \Yhere, as here, the evidence is uncontradicted and 
entirrly to the effect that the accused is the presump-
tion of sanity may not be permitted to prevail. implica-
tion to the contrary in People v. supra, 7 Cal. 
2d 257, heretofore cited and is hereby 
[13] Since the proecdure here vms in dear violation of 
petitioner's constitutional rights, the emwietion must be set 
aside (In re James, 38 Cal.2d 302, 313 [240 P .2d 596]). 
[14] Petitioner is not entitled to his and the trial 
eourt should now determine whether he is presently sane (Pen. 
Code, §§ 1367, 1368) and if so retry the issue of his sanity at 
the time of the eommission of the offenses. 
The writ is granted, the return to the order to show cause 
cause shall Ntand as thP return to the writ, and the defendant 
is diseharged from the eustody of the wardell at San Quentin 
and eommitted to the eustody of the sheriff of San Diego 
County for further proeeedings in the c·ourt of that 
eounty. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Sehauer, J., Spenee, J., 
and MeComb, J., eoneurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 1, 
1959. 
